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Commissions of inquiry are, as Merton (1975) pointed out, both users and
producers of sociological knowledge. Because commissions deal with
political issues, their reports reveal some of the ways in which such
knowledge is used for political purposes. In other words, their reports
provide excellent material for the analysis of ideology. The concept
"ideology" refers to more or less coherent sets of ideas, or modes of
discourse, which serve "to sustain relations of domination" (Thompson 1984).
Ideology operates in many ways. Of these, legitimation is probably the one
which is most often implied when the concept is used. Another is the.
dissimulation of the interests which are served by the state, or some other
political formation, and by the ideology itself. In this paper I shall
attempt to show how (quasi-) scientifically excogitated ideas were used, by
the two commissions identified in the title, to legitimate the racial order
in South Africa. The main thrust of the argument is quite simple: Socio-
cultural interpretations of social "problems" were used to justify a
political order which is structured along racial lines, and to (at least)
obscure the interests which benefit from racially based domination.
This paper is not presented here because I pretend to any novel insights
into the content of the "ruling ideology". We are all familiar with the
central components of segregationist and apartheid ideology. I think,
however, that the intensive analysis of ways in which ostensibly "scientific
commissions" employ interpretations of social problems as "legitimation
theories", is a relatively new theme on the agendas of South African social
scientists. Recent publications focus on current "adaptations" in
legitimating discourse (e.g. Buckland 1982, Stadler 1984). This paper will,
I hope, at least contribute some historical perspective towards the study of
current forms of "technisist" legitimating discourse(s). My own project
entails studying the aetiology of the ruling ideology as it is refelected in
commission reports.
One component of the project is an attempt to understand the "argumentative
structure of (ideological) discourse" (Thompson 1984, 136). It will become
obvious, however, that my "method" does not have much in commraon with
various forms of methodologically self-conscious discourse (and
hermeneutical) analysis. In this regard I can only say that I try to
understand the nature of the "legitimating theories" by looking at the
relationships between the various components of the reports of different
commissions which dealt with particular perennial issues in South African
politics; and by reading the reports with refernce to the historical
contexts in which the commissions operated. (I have not yet given attention
to the relationship between commission reports and the evidence and other
types of information on which they are based).
Because we are familiar with the relevant history of circumstances and
ideas, I shall only briefly identify and comment on the contexts within
which the two commissions conducted Uiei r invest igat Ions. Information
regarding the immediate origins and composition of the commissions is
provided. The purpose of this is primarily to highlight the ostensible
"scientific" intent of the commissions. In contravention of the rules of
academia, the paper contains no separately stated conclusions. I avoid
formal "conclusions" because they tend to be mere repetitions of statements
allready made and, especially, because this paper is incomplete in the sense
that it consists of severely abdriged excerpts from a study which dealt with
five commissions' reports (Pretorius 1985).
In the paper I deal with two commissions whose interpretations of social
"problems" are primarily "socio-cultural" rather than "structural". The
distinction between these two types of interpretations is taken from Portes
and Ferguson's (1977) discussion of "ideologies of poverty". Socio-cultural
interpretations explain social problems with reference to the normative,
attitudinal and behavioural traits of the people who experience the
situations which are regarded as "problems". (1) Such interpretations
appear in both individualistic and collectivistic variations. The former is
exemplified by the Puritan and Victorian tendencies to blame poverty on the
defects of the individual pauper. The collectivist variation is, in its
strongest form, embodied in the notion of a "culture of poverty" (Lewis,
1966). Structural explanations can also be dichotomised: on the "moderate"
side we find explanations of (e.g.) poverty with reference to certain
"dysfunctions" in otherwise adequate economic systems. Examples include
explanations with reference to cyclical movements in the economy and with
reference to disciminatory labour practices. "Radical" structural
explanations are best represented by Marxist (and other?) theories which
blame social problems on "the system" (to put it crudely). It is necessary
to emphasise that this typology of interpretations should not be seen as
suggesting anything more than analytical distinctions. Actual
interpretations tend to combine elements from the different categories.
Lewis's interpretation, for example, combines collectivist socio-cultural
and (quite radical) structural components. The interpretations which I
shall outline presently, are primarily of the collectivist socio-cultural
type, albeit with some moderate and subordinated structural elements.
The preceding comments probably indicated that I tend to use
"interpretation" as a synonym for "explanation". But I also use it quite
loosely to refer to other dimensions of quasi-theories - such as the
"diagnostic", "prescriptive" and "recommendative" (! - for lack of a better
single term) dimensions of commission reports (see Smith and Stockman,
1972).
A note about references: In the case of the Holloway report I cite the
appropriate paragraph numbers. The references to the Tomlinson report
combine chapter and paragraph numbers. Most of the references to the
Tomlinson report are to the complete report. I translated some of the
quotations from the original Afrikaans. Quotations followed by a reference
such as "(S par. x.y)" were taken from the English version of the Summary of
the Tomlinson Report. (The Summary is not a good substitute for the
complete report.) I shall quite often refer to "Holloway" and "Tomlinson"
rather than to "the Holloway Commission" and "the Tomlinson Commission".
Where the Dr. Holloway and Prof. Tomlinson are themselves the subjects, T
use their titles.
THE HOLLOWAY COMMISSION (1930-1932)
THE COMMISSION
The broad historical context, within which the Holloway report should be
read, can be identified with "Great Depression", "Pact-government" and
"Joint Councils" as the keywords. (2) Viewed in terms of socio-economic and
political processes, the context can be delineated by thinking of
industralisation, impoverishment, urbanisation, changing stratification
patterns - with the emphasis on proletarisation - and the ascendancy of
segregationism during the late twenties and early thirties. The immediate
circumstances which led to the appointment of the Holloway Commission were,
at the time, probably seen as circumstances of crisis. For example: The
beerhall-events in Durban (June 1929), Pirow's legislation and his tax-raid
in Durban (November 1929); the events in Potchefstroom (December 1929); a
failed attempt at a general strike, but many isolated ones and police
reaction thereto; ANC activity in the Boland area of the Cape; and even a
protest march in the environs of the Houses of Parliament (March 1930). Die
Burger wrote about "communist agitators" (11/3/1930) and The Cape Argus
thought that some of the demands of black leaders were "reasonable" even
though some of their statements were "ill advised, possibly unlawful"
(17/3/30). There were, of course, many calls for the appointment of a
commission of inquiry.
The origins of the Holloway Commission predate the events of 1929/30.
Commissions of inquiry often recommend the appointment of more commissions
of inquiry. The appointment of the Holloway Commission can be traced to a
request by the Economic and Wage Commission (1925). It asked for a
commission which would collect facts about the economic position of black
people. This call was taken up by the Joint Councils of Europeans and
Natives. Many of the leading figures in this movement believed that
scientific social research could provide solutions for socio-political
problems (Rich 1984; Legassick 1976). (3) Thus the National European-Bantu
Conference of February 1929 asked for "a thorough scientific investigation
by trained experts ... as a necessary preliminary to all efforts to deal
adequately and usefully with the many problems connected with the
development of the Native People" (NEBC 1929). In the Cape Times, Alfred
Hoernle* wrote that "the facts and statistics" had to be "thoroughly and
systematically investigated" before policy is framed (7/5/1930, in Legassick
1976, 23). Perhaps the most interesting formulation came from an anonymous
contributer to The Round Table (probably someone connected to the Joint
Councils):
If we have succeeded in giving a fair picture of the state of
ignorance in which legislators have set out to solve South Africa's
native problem, the need for the comprehensive survey of the economic
condition of the native people ... is obvious. A Select Committee of
the House of Assembly, unversed in the technicalities of economic,
anthropological and sociological research, has been unable in two
years to do much more than reveal the immense gaps in our knowledge.
What is now needed is the appointment of a commission of experts who
will know what information to seek, what questions to ask of
witnesses, if the true position is to be ascertained. More depends
on the drafting of questionnaires and the cross-examination of
witnesses than upon the perusal of memoranda voluntarily submitted by
local guidance as to what is relevant. Not only South Africa, but
the whole African continent, would be enabled by such a survey to
plan its Native policy on lines which would secure both continuity
and progress (RT 1930, 431).
The plea - and rumours that the appointment of a commission was imminent -
was taken up by newspapers in early March 1930 (RDM 12/3/1930; PN 12/3/1930;
CA 19/3/1930). When the matter was raised in Senate by F.S. Malan, a
clearly unhappy N.C. Havenga (Minister of Finance) admitted that a
commission would be appointed (DS 20/3/1930, col. 462-5, 478-80). The
formal commission was issued on 9 June 1930. The responsible Minister was
E.G. Jansen (Native Affairs).
The Holloway Commission was heavily loaded with state functionaries. The
expert-interest dimensions of the membership can, however, be stated in
various ways - as the following abbreviated vitae will suggest. At the time
of the investigation, the chairman, Dr. J.E. Holloway, was Director of
Census and Statistics. He was also a former Dean of Commerce at the
University of Pretoria. Later he served as Ambassador in Washington and as
High Commissioner in London. Dr. A.W. Roberts was an astronomer and
educationalist (Lovedale College). Between 1920 and 1935 he was a member of
the Native Affairs Commission, and he later served as a Senator. P.W. le R.
van Niekerk was a Nationalist parliamentarian and a member of the Native
Affairs Commission. F.A.W. Lucas was an advocate and judge, leader of the
Labour Party in the Transvaal Provincial Council, of his own Farmers and
Workers Party and, at the time of the investigation, chairman of the Wage
Board. H.C.M. Fourie was a theologian, "oudstryder" (1899-1902) and "rebel"
(1914). With his thesis (at Uthrecht) on the Religieus-sociaal leven van
die Amandabele ..., and other "Native studies", he served as the resident
anthropologist. Major R. Anderson was a Natal farmer - and during Lord
Milners* time he had served as Auditor General of the Orange Free State.
A.M. Mostert was a farmer and member of a labour advisory board.
The Holloway Commission was asked to investigate the "economic and social
conditions" of blacks; wage and industrial legislation; "the economic and
social effect upon the European and Coloured population ... of the residence
in urban areas and the measures, if any, to be adopted to deal with surplus
Natives in, and to prevent the increasing migration of Natives to, such
areas"; and matters pertaining to public revenue. The contentious issue of
the franchise was visibly absent from the brief. This can be accounted for
with reference to Gen. J.B.M. Hertzog's opposition to the idea that
commissions should deal with overtly political questions. Another factor
is, T suspect, the liberal establishment's seeming reluctance to raise such
matters at conferences and commissions. (A) Also absent from the formal
terms of reference was the equally contentious issue of land. But this was
rectified when the Commission obtained official permission to include the
rural areas within the ambit of the investigation. At the time it was
apparently not general practice to ask commissions for recommendattons.
Their function was limited to investigation. (Hence the tendency to refer
to "fact finding commissions".) But the Holloway report does contain many
policy proposals which may be read as formal recommendations.
The Commission pursued its investigation by employing procedures which
derive from both judicial and social scientific practice. The details of
these procedures are, perhaps, of less importance than the role of the
liberal establishment in the process of investigation: J.D.R. Jones, acting
for the South African Institute of Race Relations, "spent nine months or
more moving around the country ahead of the Commission to encourage and
assist Native and other groups in preparing evidence" (SAIRR 1935). He also
used the opportunity to activate Joint Councils. In this way those who
asked for an "independent", "expert" and "objective" inquiry could do much
to direct the evidence which was submitted to the Commission. The resultant
report refelcts the reception of a "theory of culture contact" by the
liberal establishment and the state (see Rich 1984). (5) If the report of
the Carnegie Commission is taken as a contemporary model for social
research, the Holloway Commissions* work left much to be desired. Unlike
the Carnegie investigators, the Holloway commissioners did not place much
emphasis on "science". They did, however, suggest that their chosen
strategy of "adaptation" (i.e. segregation - see below) would be a more
"economic" and "scientific approach to the problem" than approaches which
"disregard" the "traditional" inatitutions of blacks (par. 200-04).
On the whole, the Commission was unanimous in its findings and
recommendations. But on certain issues - I shall refer to some of these -
there was a split between Lucas, Roberts, and occasionaly Anderson, on the
one side, and the rest on the other side. Lucas and Roberts adopted a
"liberal" line. The political inclinations of the majority can be regarded
as having been in tune with emergent Afrikaner Nationalist thinking. On
issues regarding labour, Lucas was decidedly the most "radical" member.
Roberts was the only commissioner who rejected the principle of segregation.
I would, however, be reluctant to emphasise possible ideological differences
between the commissioners. With respect to the central themes of the report
the differences were relatively unimportant.
/ THE REPORT: ECONOMIC "UNDER-DEVELOPMENT" AND SEGREGATION
THE REPORT: ECONOMIC "UNDER-DEVELOPMENT" AND SEGREGATION
Commission reports often contain more or less explicit formulations of the
commissioners1 own conceptions of the socio-political "problems" which they
investigated. Those formulations sometimes camouflage the "real" concerns of
the commissioners - and of their sponsors. (1) In such cases, of which the
Holloway report is a good example, it is advisable not to to take the
commissions' own formulations of problems too seriously when analysing the
reports.
Holloway phrased the "problem" as follows: "The Native economic question is
... how best the Native population can be led onward step by step in an
orderly march to civilization" (par. 14). This is, in facti a formulation of
an intermediate policy objective. Upon reading the relevant paragraphs in
the context of the report as a whole, it becomes clear that the Commission
was primarily concerned with the consequences, for whites, of large scale
black urbanisation (including labour migration), and the attendant changes
in social stratification. These effects were presented as the consequences
of a number of more or less causally related processes: the "economic under-
development" of the reserves leads to urbanisation; urbanisation causes
"chaos" in the labour market; conditions in the labour market are related to
changes in stratification patterns; and all of this entails a serious
"threat" to white interests. To overcome the threat, segregationary and
discriminatory measures were proposed. The proposals were in line with the
tendency towards an intensification of racially based domination. According
to the Commission, the basic cause of economic underdevelopment was to be
found in the attitude and behaviour patterns of black people. It is this
explanation which was employed, implicitly or explicitly, to justify the
proposals, and thereby the segregationist political order.
The first substantive paragraph in the Holloway report suggests that
economic underdevelopment was interpreted in structural terms - as a
consequence of "conflict" between an industrial economy and a pastoral
subsistence economy (par. 8). Particular structural factors which
contributed to underdevelopment, such as taxation and the limited amount of
land available to blacks, were also identified. The structural causes were
themselves reduced to socio-cultural factors. So, for example, the
suggestion that underdevelopment was a result of "conflict" between the
industrial and subsistence economies, was qualified under the heading
Fundamentally the Problem lies in the Reserves:
It is important that the country should clearly visualize not only
the problem, but the steps necessary to deal with it in a rational
fashion. ... The Native economic question is not primarily a problem
of a small, vocal dissatisfied, semi-civilized group of urbanized
Natives; it is primarily a problem of millions of uneducated tribal
Natives, held in the grip of superstition and of an anti-progressive
social system (par. 16).
The implication is that blacks were themselves seen as the cause of under-
development. Stated more precisely: economic underdevelopment was caused
by the socto-cultural characteristics of blacks. Before this reduction of
an ostensibly structural explanation to socio-cultural factors is outlined
in somewhat more detail, it is necessary to pose the question: for whom was
underdevelopment - and its consequences - a problem? The answer lies in the
Commission's formulation of its primary policy objective: "Your Commis-
sioners endeavour to indicate in this Report some of the ways in which the
apparently conflicting interests of black and white may be harmonized in the
cause of national progress" (par. 19). The principle in terms of which the
interests were to be harmonised, makes it clear whose interests were to be
decisive:
On its European side no useful approach can be found by allowing an
undermining of the standards which the white community has built up
by centuries of effort. The European is the bearer of civilization
in South Africa, and anything which retards his civilization will
ultimately react detrimentally on the Native as well (par. 17).
The Holloway view of the socio-cultural characteristics of blacks is
contained in its description of the "social system of the Abantu", which is
itself part of a section entitled The Tribal Background of the Problem.
This clumsy - and often banal - piece of cultural anthropology states that
the "traditional" socio-political formations of blacks were embedded in, and
constituted by, a complex of "reactionary", "stagnant", and "anti-
progressive" attitude and behaviour patterns. These manifested themselves
in conservative agricultural practices, in the high religious (rather than
economic) value ascribed to cattle, in the strong paternalistic authority
structure of family units, and in status ascription on the basis of
consanguinity.
The relationship between such descriptions of the essential features of
social formations on the one hand and preference for a segregationist order
on the other, is in itself, not remarkable. However, it is put in some
perspective if one keeps in mind that the Holloway Commissionf s
contemporary, the Carnegie Commission, described poor whites in very similar
terms. But then Carnegie also distinguished between the attributes of
different catergories of poor whites (and, while it ultimately based its
recommendations on a socio-cultural explanation of white poverty, structural
factors in impoverishment were . granted independent explanatory
significance). In the Holloway report one finds very few notable attempts
at differentiating between groups of blacks. When a distinction is made
between "reserve Natives" and "more advanced Natives", it is eventually
qualified by the statement that many of the "more vocal and advanced
Natives" are not characterised by a "great sense of perspective" (par. 85-6,
684).
The Holloway commissioners did have sufficient historical and sociological
insight to realise that before "contact11 with whites, the "social and
economic organisation11 of blacks was "well developed" - given the people's
needs and circumstances (par. 21). Such insight must, of course, highlight
the structural effects of white conquest: it changed "all the essential
conditions on which their social system was founded" (par. 64). This
admission of the importance of structural factors was qualified: the effect
of "contact" on the "tribal system" was to "show up its weakness", and the
"cause of this weakness is (their) attitude towards their environment" (par.
61). Whatever structural connotations might have been read into the initial
statement of the effects of "contact", were, thus, ruled out by blaming
those effects on the socio-cultural characteristics of the victims of
conquest. For the victims there was only one solution to the problems
created by their collective traits:
Unless the tribal natives can change this attitude for one which will
permit progress, theirs will be a dark future. Their survival as a
people depends on their ability to adapt themselves to the new
environment created by a higher civilization (par. 62).
As suggested above, the recognition of structural factors in
underdevelopraent is not absent from the report. Amongst these were
mentioned the exclusion of blacks from land (par. 65-6). The general thrust
of the argument, throughout the report, however suggests that the
"attitudes" of black people and the agricultural practices which derive
therefrom were more important than limited access to land (cf. par. 92):
The "baneful effects of primitive subsistence economy" (par. 75) was more
important than the shortage of land.
The Holloway Commission argued, in effect, that white intrusion accompanied
negative economic effects on blacks, but that the causes of these effects
were to be found in attitudinal and behavioral patterns which constituted
"traditional" social formations.
The "threat" which underdevelopment supposedly entailed was mediated through
the processes of urbanisation and proletarisation. A number of factors
which contributed to the urbanisation of black people are identified in the
report. These range from economic conditions to the wish of young people to
escape from "tribal morality" (par. A3, 81, 92-3). The most important "push
factor" was economic underdevelopment. The most important "pull factor" was
the emerging industries1 unquenchable thirst for cheap labour (par, 85, 92).
But it was admited that urbanisation was not necessarily a voluntary
process:
In the past difficulty was experienced in obtaining a sufficient
supply of labour for the industries of the country. The Native in a
tribal reserve, accustomed to a subsistence economy, having, under
European rule, peace with plenty (except in a bad crop season) felt
no urge to go out to labour. ... The European Governments, wanting
labour for their industries, decided to bring pressure to bear on the
Native to force him to come out to work, and did this by imposing
taxation (par. 532). (2)
Here we have recognition of the fact that urbanisation was a consequence of
intentionally structured enforcement. Black urbanisation was designated as
a "threat" to white people, but whites encouraged it in order to feed the
mining and other industries (par. 92, 669). This admission - an admission
of one of the ironies of the "Native question" - must of course be read
within the context of the socio-cultural explanation of economic
underdevelopraent. The Commission pointed out that there were arguments
for and against the use of taxation as a lever to force black people into
industrial employment. While it suggested that it did not want to express a
view on such arguments, it felt the need to present a rather weak, though
suggestive, justification for continuation of the practice: "At present it
is an integral part of the administrative system of the country and it
certainly exerts pressure where a great deal of pressure will continue to be
required for a long time if the mass of the Natives is to advance at all"
(par. 669).
Urbanisation as such was not the Commissions' only concern. It also gave
attention to an important concomitant of urbanisation: changing patterns of
social stratification. A close reading of the report suggests that it was
the proletarisation, of both blacks and poor whites, which constituted one
important facet of the "threat" which was caused by underdevelopment.
In the Holloway report three different patterns of stratification are
distinguished: authority and status differentiation within tribal
communities, stratification in terras of labour and racial distinctions, and
a categorization of black people in terras of a combination of "geographical"
and socio-economic criteria. The descriptions of the second and third
patterns constitute important keys to understanding the politics of economic
underdevelopment - and the ideological significance of the "theory of
cultural contact".
Regarding the second pattern of stratification, the Commission's own
terminology provides material for characterising the pattern as a racially
based class system. In the relevant paragraphs we find commentary on
changing stratification as a result of population increases and increasing
"struggle for a share in the material goods". According to the Commission
the "natural division of labour", under the circumstances which were
prevalent during "the earlier period of contact between the races", was that
which obtained between skilled white labour and unskilled black labour:
"The European brought the knowledge, the skill, and the capital. The Native
had only his untutored muscular strength to contribute" (par. 523-4).
Intensified economic competition changed this uncomplicated stratification
pattern. As the numbers of "advanced Natives" increased, there also arose "a
considerable class of white people, with relativeley low efficiency" (i.e.
"poor whites"). Thus we come closer to the essence of the "threat" which,
was allegedly created by black urbanisation, and to the real meaning of the
"Native economic question":
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What are the factors in the labour problem of the Union? We have a
small class of skilled white artisans, with a reasonably high level
of efficiency and ... relatively high wages. We have, secondly, a
very large mass of low paid Native labourers who have such a low
level of efficiency that their low wages do not constitute an
international competitive advantage. In between these two we have a
considerable class of white people, with a relatively low efficiency,
albeit higher than that of the bulk of the Natives, but with a
standard of living which is difficult to maintain against Natives of
a lower efficiency, but a very much lower level of wages. We have in
addition a group of natives who have achieved a level of efficiency
comparable with that of the poor white man, who aspire to their
standard of living but who are, in company with the white man,
exposed to the competition of the great bulk of Natives. And we have
the Coloured population, who are largely, though not entirely, in the
same position. The inevitable result is a chaotic labour market,
which has harmful results for both Europeans and Natives (par. 526).
The third pattern of stratification relates to black people in urban areas.
The relevant description postulates a distinction between permanently
urbanised blacks and "temporary visitors" (migrant workers). The needs and
living standards of the latter group was described as that which was
associated with tribal life and the subsistence economy. The permanently
urbanised people, in contrast, were developing needs and aspirations
associated with "the more diversified standard of living of the Europeans"
(par. 539).
Black urbanisation, and the proletarisation of blacks and poor whites, were
the essential components of an "economic and sociological position (which
embrace) ... the interests of both white and black" (par. 550). The
Commission did not explcitly deal with "politics". That was beyond its
brief. (1) But if we understand "politics", broadly defined, as refering to
the processes and mechanisms through which societies are structured, and if
we accept that in South Africa this has always entailed the racial ordering
of the society, the political meaning of the Holloway-interpretation of the
"Native Economic Question" is disclosed.
In the somewhat melodramatic paragraph 91 of the report, the Commission
wrote that "immigration" created "in the minds of the majority of the
European community serious misgivings as to the future of the white race in
this country, for which we feel there is only too much justification if the
economic position of the Natives in the Reserves is not speedily improved".
Black urbanisation was, in fact, also designated as being detrimental to
blacks: the process removed "the more advanced Natives" from the reserves,
which retarded the development of those areas. This would, in its turn,
lead to large scale impoverishment of blacks (par. 85, 93-4). Furthermore:
migrant workers could undercut the position of the permanently urbanised
blacks because the former could, unlike their urbanised counterparts,
supplement low wages by drawing on the products of the subsistence economy.
The position of urban blacks (and of poor whites) was also conceptualised in
terms of the racially based class system: where "poor whites" and "advanced
Natives" meet each other on the Commission's stratification ladder, the
"Native economic question" becomes a problem of competition, and:
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The European population cannot he expected to remain indifferent to
the lot of a large number of their own race, who are forced down to
the lower strata of the white community by economic pressure. It
would be easy to solve the problem of the urbanized Natives by
opening to them the occupations now manned by whites in the lower
strata at wages which to them are indeed low, but which to the Native
would represent a considerable advance. If there were no colour
distinction the weakest would sink to the bottom. It would, however,
be unwise to disregard the ideal of the white community that a
minimum civilized standard must be maintained. The standard is now
being partly maintained by restrictions on the employment of Natives.
As the number of civilized and semi-civilized Natives increase,
however, this method will bear even harder on them, and will at the
same time be less efficaciuos as a protection to the white man (par.
549).
In the end, the economic difficulties faced by urban blacks and poor whites
were blamed on the migrant workers. The migrants' allegedly erratic work
habits and limited material needs (par. 551), created a "chronic state of
chaos" in "the labour market":
No regular class of urban labour gets a chance to develop because
those Natives who remain permanently in town are always subject to
the disturbing influence on wage rates of a large supply of unskilled
labour. Without some degree of permanence in the labour force no
high degree of efficiency can be expected, and the Native urban
labour is notoriously lacking in permanence.
State policy, therefore, should be directed at the object of giving
more permanence, more stability, to the various classes of labour,
and of reducing in so far as possible its casual nature (par. 556-7).
When it is read literally, this refers to urban blacks. When it is read in
the context of the Commission's description of economic relationships
between urban blacks and poor whites, the implication is that the latter
group also suffered from conditions in the labour market. As Holloway
described it, the "economic and sociological position (which embrace) ...
the interests of both white and black" was manifested in an unstable labour
market of which the dynamic element was competition between migrant workers,
urbanised blacks and poor whites. This condition was presented as a "threat"
to whites and blacks. In the final instance it was, as I shall suggest
below, specific white interest groups which were to be served by
stabilising the "chaotic labour market". The proposed measures were designed
to structure the labour market - and the society - on a racial basis.
Provision was also made for a buffer class of urbanised black workers. (2)
The Holloway Commission formulated its broad strategy for the "harmonization
of black and white interests" with reference to anthropologist G.P.
Lestrade's distinction between "repressionist", "assimilatioinist" and
"adaptanionist" policies. The Commission opted for an "adaptionist"
strategy, that is, a strategy which would be designed to "(take) out of the
Bantu past what is good, and even what is merely neutral, and together with
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what is good of European culture for the Abantu, (to , build) up a Rantu
future" (par. 200). In other words, segregation was chosen. Only Roberts
opposed this. In his view there could not "be two civilizations in South
Africa". Blacks could only progress (by) assimilating as rapidly as
possible the European civilization and culture" (par. 201).
In the report a number of variants of "segregation" were spelled out. The
preferred version was a form of "partial economic segregation". This would
have entailed the development of the reserves, the stabilisation of a
"class" of permanently urbanised black workers, the formation of "a class of
more or less specialized land workers", and the rational channeling of
temporary labour. Development of the reserves was prescribed as a key
component of the strategy. It would, the Commission believed, have had "the
effect ... that the classes of urban and rural labour will tend to
crystallize to an extent which will enable greater efficiency among both",
and "to create a more economical distribution of the labour forces" (par.
695). This, of course, indicates the major interests which were to be
served by segregation. The beneficiaries were in fact identified quite
explicitly: "In the interest of the efficiency of urban industries it is
better to have a fixed urban Native population to the extent that such a
population is necessary" (par. 500).
With regard to governmental institutions the Commission argued in favour of
"using Native institutions as part of the administration of the country"
(par. 204). The development of the reserves had to limit the rate of
urbanisation - or, to put it more accurately, provide the conditions for
controlling the supply of labour. The harnessing of "traditional"
institutions would provide, the Commission hoped, a source of political
legitimacy (and instruments for social control) for the racial order. For
the Holloway Commission this "adaptionist" strategy embodied both "the point
of view of logical and economic administration" and, "if recognition is
accorded to (Native) institutions in the administration of the Reserves",
the opportunity to influence "(the Natives1) whole outlook in regard to the
European" (par. 205).
The interests which were to be served by the strategy can be highlighted by
way of giving brief attention to the views of the majority faction within
the Commission. The "pass laws" were the focus of much of the "unrest"
amongst black people which precipitated the appointment of the commission.
With opposition from Lucas and Roberts, the Commission supported the
retention, though not the expansion, of the relevant measures. This was
justified with reference to the need to limit black urbanisation, to
regulate labour supply; and, in general, to regulate the movement of black
people outside the reserves (par. 724-7, 733). By way of rethorical
questions, the majority (Holloway, Fourie, Mostert and Van Niekerk)
rationalised their position on the pass laws as follows:
In our opinion the reason and justification for (the pass laws) must
be looked for in the fact of the contact between the higher European
civilization and the primitive indigenous society of the Native. In
the case of the town, how far can the European social order allow
free intermixture with the Native with his generally low standard of
living? In the case of the farms, is the Native too irresponsible,
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too untied to his employment by his living requirements to be allowed
complete freedom of movement without economic disorganization of
agriculture resulting from it7 And if so, can some form o£
regulation of his movements be devised without injustice or the
creation of intolerable hardship to him? (par. 725).
In evidence it was suggested to the Commission that the introduction of
minimum wages in certain labour categories would limit the "disruptive"
influence of migrant labour. Anderson, Lucas and Roberts recommended "that
the existing laws relating to the regulation of wages and conditions of
employment should be made to apply to the Natives in the industries to which
those laws are applicable, due care being taken not to proceed so rapidly as
to prevent trade and industry from being able to adapt themselves to any
changes" (par. 1055). The majority opposed this - because wage regulation
would, in their view, encourage urbanisation and because it would have
detrimental effects also on those industries which were not directly
affected by wage regulation, in particular mining and farming:
These industries have this in common, that the margin of productive
enterprise is determined largely by the productiveness of natural
resources. An artificially created higher level of urban wages must
necessarily increase wages in these industries. This would depress
marginal production, of which there is a great deal not only in
respect of low-grade ore, but also of all classes of farming, and
would thus directly reduce the national income. This would not be to
the advantage either of the country as a whole, or of the Natives as
a group (par. 1005).
Segregation and discrimination would, of course, not develop the reserves
and thereby remove underdevelopment as a cause of urbanisation. A number of
practical developmental measures were proposed. In accordance with the
socio-cultural explanation of underdevelopment, the core of the plan was,
however, to resocialise the people: "The economic development of the
Reserves - which postulates social educational development ... of the
natives in those areas - transcends in importance every other phase of the
native economic policy" (par. 85). It was deemed "necessary in the first
instance to change the attitude of mind of a people before the natives as a
whole can become part of an orderly advanced economic system" (par. 552).
To summarise: The Holloway Commission's most important proposals were
predicated on the argument that the economic conditions of black people and,
in particular, the instability of the urban labour market, was the
consequence of the economic underdevelopment of the reserves. These
conditions were themselves ascribed to the socio-cultural characteristics of
black people. In order to limit urbanisation, to provide industry and
farming with a regulated labour supply, and to safeguard poor whites against
competition for jobs, the reserves had to be developed. Development was to
be achieved primarily by resocialising blacks - in effect to make them
servicable to the needs of capitalism. Because this would be a long term
project, "other measures ... which (would) have a speedier effect" had to be
considered (par. 562). These included influx control, work reservation and
wage regulation. The Commission also prescribed the stabilisation of the
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labour market as a precondition for the "creation" of "a class of more
efficient urban Natives" (par, 558). It was not phrased as such, but the
function of this class would also have been to serve as a buffer between
whites and "tribal Natives". With the aid of the buffer, through the
ostensible development of the reserves, and by resocialising blacks into
appropriate attitudinal and behavioural patterns, the economic and political
dominance of whites could be assured. (10)
THE TOMLINSON COMMISSION (1950-1955)
THE COMMISSION
In many respects Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu
Areas was an elaborate update of the Native Economic Commission. The
context can be described in terms of the same processes as those mentioned
with reference to the Holloway Commission. There were also differences:
Depression was followed by growth, relatively radical Afrikaner Nationalists
came to power in 1948, and African Nationalism was resurgent. Largely as a
result of the Second World War, industrialisation accelarated during the
decade preceding the appointment of the Tomlinson Commission. This
increased the rate of black urbanisation. The needs created by the war led
to some slackening of influx control, and there was - at least on the level
of political discourse emanating from bodies such as the Social and Economic
Planning Council and the Fagan Commission - some promise that segregationary
and discriminatory measures were up for review. In the last days of the
United Party's reign, reform was in the air - so to speak. In fact, this
"reform talk" was part of an agenda for which the Holloway Commission could
claim co-authorship. The discourse of reform was, however, contradicted by
the intensification of oppression. In the event, the ideological trends
embodied in the Fagan report and in the United Party's election platform for
1948, were interrupted by an apparently different trend: the arrival of
segregationisra in its more radical form - Apartheid.
The National Party fought the 1948 election on the basis of, amongst other
things, the policy prescriptions of its own Sauer Commission. Sauer
advocated a policy, and an ideology, of apartheid. It was based on existing
segregationary traditions and practices. As an ideology, Apartheid was
articulated by Afrikaner intellectuals at least since the early forties.
After 1948 it became an important instrument in the consolidation of the
"Afrikaner volk", and for the legitimation of Afrikaner, and eventually
white, rule. The apartheid ideologues could appeal to well established
segregationary ideas - and thus to the vast majority of the white
electorate. They grafted eclectic segregationisra onto cultural and ethnic
nationalism and turned it into a coherent set of ideas; the logic of which
demanded and justified the total separation of "nations" ("volke").
If the stated objectives of apartheid - territorial separation, the drastic
limitation of black urbanisation, the separation of nations - were to be
achieved, segregationist legislation would not be sufficient. The Holloway
and other commissions found, unsurprisingly, that the reserves could not
accommodate all the people who were supposed to stay there most of the time.
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The new government's plans required that the reserves should accoraodate
them. The Tomlinson Commission had to prepare a programme of development
which would make this possible.
Segregation and discrimination evoked increasingly strong reaction from
blacks. Although opposition against intensified oppression (despite the
liberal promises of the UP) - from the industrial action of the forties to
the Defiance Campaign - does not seem to have had anything to do with the
appointment of the Commission, it affected its arguments. Political
movements and ideas grow from action and reaction. Blacks (as well as
"coloureds" and "Indians") reacted against increasing segregation.
Opposition intensified as apartheid rhetoric and legislation made explicit
the mode of domination which the liberal promises of the late forties had
attempted to conceal. As we shall see, this opposition was used by the
Tomlinson Commission to support its case for apartheid.
The Sauer Commission proposed that "planning committees" be established to
bring about a "diversification" of economic activities in the reserves. The
need for research-based planning for the development of the reserves also
received attention in the 1946 report of the Social Economic and Planning
Council. The idea which inspired the appointment of Tomlinson was thus not
new. The Commission was, nevertheless, the result of an initiative of the
Suid-Afrikaanse Buro vir Rasse-Aangeleenthede. In February 1950 SABRA's
Council took a decision containing the main points of an economic programme
for "the execution of a positive policy for separate native development"
(SABRA 1950, 109-10). The six points contained in the decision represent a
good summary of the most important recommendations which eventually emanated
from the Tomlinson Commission. The decisions were conveyed, in late March
1950, to Dr. D.F. Malan and his Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. E.G. Jansen.
On this occassion "the necessity for comprehensive research" was emphasised.
Jansen took the initial steps to constitute the Commission. In October he
was replaced by Dr. H.F. Verwoerd who, most reluctantly, finalised the
matter. (Verwoerd believed that he and his officials did not need a
Commission to lay plans for apartheid (Scholtz 1974, 242) and he actually
did his best to obstruct the investigation.)
The Commission consisted of nine members. Prof. F.R. Toralinson was an
agricultural economist at the University of Pretoria (at the time, all
members of agricultural faculties were employed by the Department of
Agriculture). M.D.C. de W. Nel was a Member of Parliament who concerned
himself with "native affairs" and who became Minister of Bantu
Administration and Development (1958-1961). C.W. Prinsloo was the assistant
manager of Non-White Affairs for the Pretoria Municipality and, later,
Assistant Secretary of the Department of Information. J.H. Janse van
Rensburg was a farmer, as was G.J. Badenhorst. C.B. Young was assistant
vice-secretary (development) of the Department of Native Affairs. Prof.
C.H. Badenhorst was an educationalist and theologian. Dr. J.H. Moolman was
a geographer at the Council for the Developemnt of Natrual Resources (later
director of the Africa Institute). The agronomist and genetician, Prof.
F.X. Laubscher, resigned soon after appointment. He was replaced by another
agronomist, Prof. J.H.R. Bisschop. Only Toralinson, Badenhorst and Bisschop
were "full time commissioners".
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It was a commission of experts, albeit with a significant complement of
state functionaries. The chairman insisted that the investigation would be
thoroughly scientific (Toralinson 1979, 6; DT 25/11/50). For this, the
assistance of a large number of experts were obtained, including economists,
business economists, anthropologists, medical experts, sociologists,
geographers, and at least one political scientist. The Commission conducted
an impressive amount of primary field research - and claimed that the report
was based largely on "original research". It also listened to witnesses. In
this respect, as in other facets of the investigation - and, in fact, in the
authorship of the report - members of SABRA played a key role. The report
was presented, explicitly and with much emphasis, as being "scientific".
The chairman claimed that the Commission did not base its report on "a
political point of departure", and that only chapter 25 was "ideological".
For the rest: "Ek het dit ray ten doel gestel om die wetenskaplike feite in
verband met die vraag aan die volk te stel" (DH 7/5/56, 9, 11).
THE REPORT: ECONOMIC UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND APARTHEID
Both in terms of problem formulation and interpretation, the Tomlinson
report represents a more sophisticated, and more radical, rendition of ideas
which appear in the Holloway Report. Like its predecessor, the Tomlinson
Commission investigated the "Native question", and interpreted it in terms
of a "theory of culture contact". For Tomlinson, the "primary" cause of the
"urgent nature of our Native question" was the "process of integration".
This "problem" would be "increased in intensity and scope if the process
(was) allowed to continue":
(Dit) sou ... 'n groot dwaasheid wees ora die oe" te sluit vlr die
problerae, en die gevare, vir Blank en Bantoe, wat deur die magte van
ineenstrengeling ontketen is. Dit is verder klaarblyklik dat die
gevare in die eerste plek saamhang met die feit dat *n toenemende deel
van die Bantoebevolking besig is om \i permanente domicilium in die
nie-Bantoegebiede te verkry (par. 25.70).
Integration between whites and blacks was regarded as a "problem" because it
would have certain detrimental consequences for whites. The process of
integration was described as a manifestation as well as a consequence of
"aanraking" ("contact") between whites and blacks. Furthermore, in its
later phases "contact" was, through the process of urbanisation, converted
into an immediate and serious "threat" for whites. Urbanisation was
ascribed primarily - as we may expect - to the underdevelopment of the
reserves.
In contrast to Holloway, who largely camouflaged the essentially political
contents of the "Native question", Tomlinson stated it quite explicitly:
"Permanente domicilium van enige bepaalde gebied skep fn prioriteitsreg vir
sodanige persoon en sy afstammelinge ora as volledige burgers van die gebied
aanvaar te word" (par. 25.70). Toralinson held that the "Native question"
could only be resolved by following a "total approach". "Fragmentary
approaches", such as those adopted by other commissions (apparently the
Fagan Commission, in particular), "necessarily gave rise to a limited view
and unsatisfactory recommendations". Tomlinson wanted to avoid such
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shortcomings by insisting on "a clear and purposeful policy, as well as the
logical application and co-ordination of the principles laid down" (S par.
25.3) . For Toralinson the desirable, and the only possible, policy was one
of "separate development" or "apartheid". (11)
As in the case of the Holloway Commission, The Tomlinson commission's
"theory of culture contact" holds forth a particular view of the collective
characteristics of black people. Tomlinsonfs exposition of these
characteristics can be found in chapter 1 of the report. It is,
essentially, a more detailed, and a more self-consciously anthropological
("volkekundige" rather than "sosiaal-antropologiese"), essay about social
phenomena such as those described by Holloway. The description of the other
"element" in the "process of contact" - the "Europeans" - does not contain,
interestingly enough, much anthropology. It is nevertheless clear, that the
core of the interpretation is the notion of a clash between "civilisations"
or "cultures". The following quotation summarises the Commission's views on
the essential difference between the two "civilsations":
In *n bespreking van die kultuur van die Bantoe moet in gedagte gehou
word dat hulle tot die primitiewe volke van die wereld behoort.
Hiermee word bedoel dat hulle 'n eenvoudige en natuurlike lewenswyse
handhaaf, wat nog tot fn groot mate staties is en nie die dinamiese
eleraente openbaar waardeur raoderne gemeenskappe gekenraerk word nie
(par. 1.35).
The exposition of the process of culture contact begins with a "historical
survey" (par. 2.5-121). For our present purposes, this is of less
importance than the more "analytical" components of the interpretation.
Since the survey provides an excellent example of historiography as
ideology, a few remarks are, nevertheless, in order. The survey is a
biased, euro-centric rendition of white occupation of South Africa and of
the evolution of white policies vis-a-vis blacks. It provides case material
for a study on Afrikaner nationalist historiography (cf. Thompson 1962,
1966). The Commission's own formulation of conclusions (par. 2.171-121)
reveals the purposes of the survey: (i) It had to justify whites1 claims to
87% of South African territory; (ii) it had to prove that whites reserved
the reserves for blacks in the interest of blacks; (iii) it had to prove
that "the principle of territorial separation" had previously been
recognised by all white South African governments, and that apartheid thus
had historical legitimacy; and (iv) it had to prove that relationships
between whites and blacks - and thus whites' claims to the "European area",
as well as to "the principle of territorial separation" - had a contractual
basis.
The ostensibly scientific rationale for apartheid is cast in the form of a
quasi-theoretical construction which predicts biological assimilation as the
"inexorable" ("onverbiddelike") consequence of "unhindered" contact between
different "nations", and of the consequent "acculturation" and
"enculturation" of the nations. The exposition, as we find it in chapter 2
of the report, is in fact a somewhat haphazard admixture of concepts and
ideas which were drawn from a variety of anthropological and race relations
studies.
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tn the Commission^ "theory", the concept "volk" refers to the most.
comprehensive real and desirable societal form. A "volk" is "an organism"
which consists of "a number of persons grouped together on the basis of a
common cultural posession" ("gemeenskaplike kultuurbesit"). A "volk" is
more than a collection of individuals: The norms, attitudes, and behaviour
patterns of the individual derive from "his integratedness in his society".
This organic conception of society made it possible for the commission to
argue that "contact" and "amalgamation" ("vermenging") upsets the "balance"
between nations as well as that of their individual members (par. 2.122).
This contention was supported with recourse to the structural-functionalist
anthropology of, i.a. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown (1952). Following a quotation
from his work, it was claimed that the "meeting and amalgamation"
("sametreffing en vermenging") of nations leads to a "dysnoraic social
condition". Consequently "various events take place": firstly "tensions"
and "clashes" occur within and between nations; secondly, "one or both the
'volksorganisraes1 disintegrate"; thirdly, a condition of "eunomy" may return
through "the total extinction of one organism", or through the complete
absorption of one organsira by the other without significant modification of
the remaining organism's culture, or through "reintegration to a new
organism" (par. 2.123-4).
With reference to the work of P.A.F. Walter (1952) and R.F.A. Hoernle
(1945), the "inexorable process of integration" was presented as proceeding
through successive phases. Hoernle provided the model with the most local
content. In his view the process would proceed from cultural through
economic, social, and political integration, to eventuate in biological
assimilation (par. 2.129). This conception is itself analogous to a key
assumption of systemic and structural-functional theories: the notion that
change in one component of a society leads to changes in the others. It is
this sort of conception which compelled the theoreticians of apartheid to
insist on separation between black and white in all sectors of society.
The commission attempted to bolster its interpretation with reference to a
variety of authors' works. In this way it repeatedly found different
concepts for saying the same thing (e.g. par. 25.25). The essence of the
message was that the process of culture contact - i.e. integration - would
lead, unfailingly, to biological assimilation. In the work of Herskovitz
(1949), however, a way was found to neutralise the immanent "law of
integration":
Dat hierdie "cultural drift" deur doelbewuste optrede, of deur iets
anders wat voorval, in 'n ander rigting gestuur kan word, word deur
vooraanstaande volkekundiges soos byvoorbeeld deur Herskovits erken
(par. 2.131).
It was possible, after all, to avoid the unavoidable. (12) But before the
the means to this end could be presented, the dynamics of integration had to
be described in more detail. This was done by discussing various factors
which could influence the process of integration. These include the nature
of the "contact situation", differences in "cultural level", population
ratios, "racial differences", "psychological differences", the tempo of
socio-economic change, "cultural distance", and "Europeans' resistance to
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HSHlrailatton" (par. 2.132-58). Regarding this discussion of factors the
(:ol lowing comments will suffice: (i) It confirms that the Commission
interpreted socio-political processes primarily in terms of "culture". The
structural dimensions of "contact" received no recognition. (ii) The
purpose of the discussion was simply to reafirm that all the factors would
contribute to acute "disnomy". Population figures, in particular, were used
in arguments which had to evoke fear of various "threats" - such as a
perpetually conflictual relationship ("strydverhouding") and "the collapse
of the superior culture", (iii) Such evocative arguments were strengthened
by placing emphasis on whites' resistance against integration. They were
also bolstered by stressing black opposition to discrimination - a feature
of the social order which, it was claimed, could be removed by "total
apartheid".
In the penultimate section of chapter 2, the Commission presented its own
view of historical "phases in the process of contact". For the Commission's
purpopses, the critical phases were the third and the fourth, i.e. the
"urbanisation phase" and the "reaction phase". The "urbanisation phase" was
described as follows:
As the result of the intrusion of the European into the living sphere
of the Bantu during the second phase, a need for the cultural
possessions of the Europeans arose among the Bantu. But the means
for obtaining . these posessions were not to be found in the Bantu
Areas, and therefore, an exodus of Bantu workseekers ... to the
European Areas took place. Owing to the cultural distance between
the European and the Bantu ... the European now refuses to admit the
Bantu to the heart of his own sphere of life, and the Bantu thus
becomes a mere independent "squatter" in the European living area (S
par. 2.92; par. 2.259)
The "reaction phase" is the one in which blacks react(ed) against their
"exclusion" from the "European sphere of life". According to Tomlinson
blacks did so in three ways - of which "attempts at intrusion" and
"nationalistic movements11 were singled out for special attention. "Attempts
at intrusion" is a Tomlinson codeword which means resistance against white
domination. The description of resistance entails little more than
scapegoat and enemy labelling: "Attempts at intrusion" were led by
organisations in which "communist elements" were present, and the "desire
for intrusion into the European community and the consequent levelling
('gelykmaking1)" was "completely in accordance with the the ideal of
communism" (par. 2.229). "Nationalistic movements" were embodied in the
"independent" and "sectarian" churches. These aimed at the establishment of
a separate "sphere of life" for blacks (par. 2.230-4). The "attempts at
intrusion" would lead to an intensified "strydverhouding". That is, unless
"the European" was prepared "to allow the Bantu to enter into the core of
his sphere of life and, in so doing, to surrender his own identity" (par.
2.254). With reference to the nationalist tendency, the fear was expressed
that it would develop into a powerful anti-white nationalism. But in this
possibility the Commission also saw an opportunity for the realisation of
apartheid:
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Die Kommissie meen egter dat dit wel moontlik is om die omstandighede
te skep waardeur hierdie (nasionalistiese) aspirasies .. in die regte
bane gelei kan word. Indien byvoorbeeld aan die Bantoe die
moontlikheid gebied word ora in sy eie tuisgebiede sy eie nasionale
bestaan te voer ..., kan hierdie drang tot selfuitlewing en
handhawing fn heilsame verloop he", aangesien die strydverhouding
daardeur verrainder word (par. 2.258).
The Commissions1 representation of reaction against domination served to
focus attention on the specific and immediate "threats" which continued
integration would entail for whites. As such, the representation could
underscore the following decision: whites had to choose between "two poles
of thought" which "have arisen in consequence of contact", namely
"apartheid" and "liberalism", or, "between the maintenance of separate
identities and the process of coalesence, between the traditional African
way of life and the Neo-Western way of life" (S par. 3.29.ix).
Even the most ardent adherents of socio-cultural interpretations of
political processes cannot ignore the fact that the history of "contact"
between white and black in South Africa had structural dimensions and
consequences. There are, thus, some structural accents in the Toralinson
history. The Commission however reduced the structural dimensions of
conquest and domination to talk about changes in "views of life"
("lewensbeelde"). This is especially visible in an exposition of the
"results of contact" in the third chapter of the report. The only
significant reference to the structural consequences of conquest appears in
the conclusion that the "social division" (which was imposed "because the
cultural difference between master and servant was so great") acquired,
"with the onset of industrialisation and the influx of Bantu labour, an
economic meaning". The division became "a protective measure for the
European worker and a barrier against disturbing the traditional pattern of
race relations"; a "colour bar" which "tied the culturally backward Bantu to
unskilled and serai-skilled jobs" (par. 3.141-2). That discrimination is an
instrument for the exploitation of cheap labour was not an issue for further
consideration. On the contrary: the existence of a capitalist economy was
presented as a "threat" to the "integrity" of "die Blanke volksorganisme",
because "the inclusion (of Bantu) in one sphere" would, "according to the
law of integration", inevitably lead to integration "in other spheres of
life, and eventually also in the. biological sphere" (par. 3.150). By way of
this line of argumentation, the commission came to stating the white fears
concerning urbanisation and changing patterns of stratification:
Daar is ... 'n stygende getal (Bantu), veral diegene wat reeds die
tweede of derde generasie van stedelike bewoners vorm en somraige wat
moontlik deur onderwys "progressief" geword het, wat hul toekoms en
belange in die breer ekonomiese verband van Suid-Afrika sien, en wat
hoer aspirasies het as net die beoefening van ongeskoolde werk. Hul
persoonlike ambisie laat hulle strewe na beter werkkringe en groter
inkoraste om groeiende behoeftes van westerse oorsprong te bevredig.
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Sulke Bantu probeer ook om langs politieke weg hul.le ideale te
bereik. Hullo probeer om hul aosiale aansien te verhoog, en beter
status in die samelewing te verkry. Die ou verhouding tussen heer en
diensbode begin onder stedelike en geiiidustrialiseerde orastandighede
vervaag.
Hier is 'n ander distribusie van rykdom: daar is baie Blanke "armes"
en baie Bantoe "rykes". Hier begin die Bantoe neerkyk op soramige
Blankes en soramige Blankes begin opkyk na soramige Bantoe. Die
handhawing van afsonderlike woonbuurte verhinder tot op sekere hoogte
dat hierdie proses van styging aan die een kant en daling aan die
anderkant sy voile uitwerking het. Die reeds lankalbestaande
skeidslyn tussen swart en wit het ook nog sy effek maar dit begin sy
krag verloor (par. 3.163-5)
In chapter 25 of the report, the concern with changing stratification (and
its political implications) is reflected in one of various lists of
consequences of "evolutionary" integration. Integration would lead to (i)
"cultural assimilation", (ii) "the removal or disappearance of all economic
measures differentiating between the two groups ... (which would) lead to
the development of a socio-economic stratification based not on colour, but
on purely social-economic considerations", (iii) "cultural and economic
equality leading to political equality, and the creation of a common society
in the political sphere", (iv) "increased social contact and association",
leading to "personal relations" being "based upon socio-economic preferences
or prejudices" and, finally
 t (v) "complete racial assimilation" (S par.
25.13, par. 25.25)
The Commission recognised that urbanisation was a universal process; that it
was a consequence of the interaction between opportunities created by
industrialisation in the urban areas and the lack of such opportunities in
rural areas (par. 7.33). It described the reserves as "underdeveloped"
(par. 26.3), and its findings on the "geographical income" of the reserves
could have served as devastating commentary on the lack of development since
the Holloway Commission. This underdevelopraent had to3 be reversed in order
to prevent "one or more" of the following: "increasing poverty in the
reserves, increasing migration of labour, and "permanet emigration of
inhabitants especially to the European cities" (par. 24.65). Tomlinson
explained economic underdevelopment in much the same way as Holloway did.
However, by virtue of its composition and the vast resources of scholarly
expertise to which it had access, the Toralinson Commission was also a much
more sophisticated tool of investigation than the Holloway Commission.
Perhaps for this reason, its explanation of underdevelopment also had a
solid, albeit moderate, structural component. As the commission saw it, the
impact of the external economies which resulted from the original
localisation ofindustries, was one of the more important causes of the
underdevelopraent of the reserves (par. 26.7). Furthermore, the placement
infrastructure, relative to the location of the reserves, as well as the
"mobility" of black labour, was aided by the "neglect" of the reserves:
planning and the provision of infrastructure was largely limited to the
"European areas" (par. 26.11-2). Other factors which were mentioned included
the lack of opportunity for blacks "to exert the necessary pressure in
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favour oC the establishment of infrastructure in the reserves", whites'
reluctance to invest there, the system of reservation which itself precluded
white investment, and the limited financial resources available to the state
and to the inhabitants of the reserves (par. 26.12-8).
Tomlinson did not exactly dwell on two of the more important causes of
underdevelopment: taxation and the drastic limitation of blacks1 access to
land. The role of taxation as a factor in the supply of black labour, and
thereby in urbanisation, was recognised (e.g. par. 2.192). There are also
references to the limitations placed on access to land. These references
are, however, incidental footnotes to the socio-cultural components of the
Commissions1 interpretation. Certainly the Commissions explanation of
black urbanisation is, in this respect, in no way comparable to Grosskopf's
(1932) thorough analysis of the structural causes of white urbanisation. In
the Toralinson scheme it was, in any case, the culture rather than the
economy of blacks which was disrupted by tax.
Besides the "theory of culture contact", a variety of other argumentative
devices were employed to justify apartheid. Amongst these we find
statements of principles regarding the "moral duty and right" of nations to
existence - and the moral duty of nations not to deny other nations that
right (25.37). In the process of providing such justifications, the
Commission also emphasised the political consequences of integration - thus
making explicit the political purposes of apartheid: if integration was
allowed to proceed it would lead to a situation in which blacks would
"eventually constitute the majority of the electorate". This would terminate
"the European 'orientation1 of our legislation and government ('bewind1)"
(par. 25.31). The Commission concluded that there was no middle road
between total apartheid and total integration. (Commissioner Bisschop did
not support the most overtly ideological of the Tomlinson chapters - chapter
25 - but his opposition entailed little more than doubts about the
feasability of apartheid. He supportred the principle (par. 25.93).)
The Commission's terms of reference asked for the formulation of a
development programme for the reserves. They did not ask for justifications
for either apartheid or a development programme. The unsolicited
justification for apartheid, however, also became a justification for
economic development. The logic of the theory of culture contact, and of
the way in which urbanisation was interpreted, demanded the development of
the reserves. If economic underdevelopraent of the reserves was the
immediate cause of urbanisation, and if urbanisation created the conditions
for integation, integration could only be avoided by developing the
reserves. Without such a "fundamental reorientation of our economic
structure" (par. 25.74), the plea for total apartheid would in any case have
been recognisable as a blatant prescription of white domination. In other
words, the theory of culture contact provided the intellectual rationale for
apartheid, while economic development of the reserves had to provide the
material conditions for separate socio-political structures and the
acceptance thereof by blacks. The ideological nexus between apartheid and
economic development is thus reciprocal: the one justifies the other. But
the maintenance of white domination, at least over the greater part of South
African territory, was stated by the Commission as a precondition for the
development of the reserves. This needs to be emphasised because it draws
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attention to the legitmating function of the programme for development - and
of economic development as such. After the publication of the report,
commentators tried to break the link between the development programme and
the prescription of apartheid. As Sheila Van der Horst (1956,/111) put it:
"The fact bears repeating that the acceptance of the ideology of separate
development by the Commission is not a ground for rejecting its practical
recommendations for economic development." (See also Ballinger 1969, 326.)
Such judgements ignore the tie between the plea for apartheid and the
proposed development programme. As far as the Tomlinson Commission was
concerned, the choice was not between apartheid and the development of the
reserves, but between apartheid and integration. In chapter 26 the
Commission declared the "necessity for development" to be "a function of the
socio-economic objectives which are envisaged" (S par. 26.1). The
Commission said that its dicussion of these objectives emphasised "in the
first place ... the economic determinants of social welfare". It did not,
however, want "to suggest" that such considerations were "of overriding
importance": "Dit is nie alleen ekonomiese oorweginge en ekonoraiese
beginsels wat in aanmerking geneem moet word nie, maar eweseer ook die
daarraee samehangende staatkundige en maatskaplike oograerke. Trouens,
laasgenoerade is van so groot belang dat hulle ten voile die ontwikkeling van
die Bantoegebiede regverdig (par. 26.91). The Commission did "emphasise
that the development programme would not forfeit value or feasibility if the
principle of developing the Bantu areas as a national home is rejected"
(par. 51.2, see also par. 51.77). However, these were postscripts in the
last chapter of a 3 755 page report in which the choice between integration
and apartheid was stated in absolute terms. It was also made quite clear
that whites would not support the burden of development if it would "not
promote the solution of our Native question" (par. 25.88-90). Some twenty
years after completion of the inquiry, Prof. Toralinson explained "die denke
agter die verslag":
Mens ... moet ... jouself die vraag af vra of so ' n groot en
oravattende plan nodig was of is. Nou wil ek dit vir u so stel dat,
sonder die uitgangspunt van afsonderlike ontwikkeling sou 'n
grootskaalse ontwikkelingsplan vir die Gebiede en veral soos ons
voorgestel net, onnodig, amper sinneloos, gewees het (Tomlinson 1976,
12).
The Tomlinson-programrae can be summarised as follows: Through "apartheid"
or "separate development", "total" separation between white and black had to
be achieved . The objective of this was to safeguard the dominant political
and economic position of whites in 87% of the country. The specific
recommendations for the achievement of this objective were presented as part
of a comprehensive socio-economic development programme for the reserves.
Large scale development of the reserves would require "comprehensive
planning" (par. 48.2-9) - planning which had to provide for both the
economic transformation of the reserves and the resocialisation of the
inhabitants of the reserves. Also implied in the rationale for planning
was the reconstruction of "traditional" political structures - but with a
view to socio-economic modernisation. This means that socio-economic
reconstruction would, in fact, not be directed at the maintenance, or the
reconstruction, of "traditional" structures, but at the adaption of such
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structures to "Western concepts" (par. 27.3). (13)
T have argued that the commission subordinated economic considerations to
political objectives. (14) Apart from the fact that such conceptual
splitting of the polity and the economy is itself an ideological stratagem,
it needs to be emphasised that the split was performed with reference to an
economy which is, as the Commission admitted, reliant on vast supplies of
cheap black labour. Arguments which rejected apartheid as being
economically unfeasible were charged as being shortsighted because they
ignored the political consequences of "economic integration and because
reliance on cheap labour might prove to be dysfunctional (par. 25.71). Even
if this reply is accepted, one may still want to know what the implications
of total apartheid might be for the availability of labour. The Commission
found ways of assuring its audience that a lage supply of cheap, well
regulated labour would be available for a long time to come (par. 35.97,
35.111). Thus the development programme would make it possible for whites
to legitimate their domination over 87% of the country with reference to the
political and economic opportunities which would be made available in the
reserves, while the white ruled economy could continue to grow with the aid
of black labour.
The nexus between the theory of culture contact and the development
programme seems to be inconsistent. Wheras the interpretation of the
process of "culture contact" emphasises social-cultural factors, the
programme was directed at the "fundamental reorientation" of the economy;
i.e. structural intervention, albeit with inclusion of plans to resocialise
blacks. The apparent inconsistency between interpretation and programme can
be accounted for in terms of the Commissionfs concern with processes which
had implications for the political-economy. The interpretation of "contact1
between whites and blacks in social-cultural terras obscures, but does not
coceal, the concern with the structural, political, consequences of
urbanisation and changing stratification patterns. Seen in this way, the
interpretation and the programme are not inconsistent with each other. They
are intertwined sets of ideas which serve to legitimate a comprehensive
attempt at social engineering through both cultural (resocialisation) and
structural (development, segregation) mechanisms. When the report is read
in this way apartheid becomes recognisable as an ideology for the
legitimation of a political order which had to contain processes of class
formation and its consequences for political group formation by organising
people in terras of the Idea of Culture: Culture is used to fight Class.
The "undesirable" correlates of industrial capitalism could, however, not be
eliminated without endangering the maintenance that order. Hence it was not
sufficient to control black labour through the mechanisms of segregation and
migrant labour. Blacks also had to be resocialised in accordance with
"western concepts ... while always keeping in mind the Bantu's scale of
values". The Toralinson Commission declared its support for the findings of
the Native Education Commission (1951), lamented the fact that black
children were not "trained for service in (their) own Bantu community", and
declared that education "must provide persons trained in the modern
technique of a progressive economy" (S par. 43.1, 43.6, 43.14). I think we
know what this meant.
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NOTES
(1) The people who interpret the "problems" are the people who construct the
situations as "problems",
(2) The books by Lacey (1981) and Rich (1984) are essential reading.
(3) This view was then, as it is now, quite widespread. It also inspired
the sponsors of the Carnegie and Wilcocks Commissions.
(4) The Joint Council movement (largely through the person of J.D.R. Jones)
also initiated the Wilcocks Commission. In this case, also, "political"
issues were kept away from conferences. The Wilcocks Commission did,
despite its limited terms of reference, deal with the franchise - mainly due
to pressure from Dr. A. Abdurahman (a member).
(5) An important early commentary on the report is Brookes (1933).
(6) The commissioning authority - here the government - and the interest
groups who were most closely associated with calling for a commission. I
traced the origins of the Holloway to the initiatives of the liberal
establishment. Lacey (1981, 148) argues that the "government's purpose, and
the NEC's real brief" was the advancement of farmers' interests.
(7) This was emphasised by Lucas, who gave much critical attention to
taxation as an instrument for creating labour supply.
(8) This reflects the ideological separation of "politics" and "economics".
It also reflects Prime Minister Hertzog's reluctance to submit "political"
issues to commissions.
(9) It is a strategem which reappeared in, i.a. the Fagan report and, more
recently in the Theron report (with reference to "coloureds"), the Riekert
report and reports of the Presidents1 Council.
(10) Cf. Davies 1979, 247-50.
(11) These labels were used interchangeably.
(12) From the perspective of logicians, at least, there is obviously some
inconsistency in the argument: integration is at the same time ineluctable
and unavoidable. For "socio-logicians" this is not necessarily inconsistent.
They, like the Commission, (hopefully) recognise that history is made by
men. But there is also another side to the Tomlinson argument. The
Commission, and other apartheid ideologists, needed to sell their vision.
This required that integration had to be represented as being both
unavoidable and avoidable. If either of these arguments was left out, the
vision would have been much less convincing. The emphasis on the
inevitability of integration - if it is not counteracted - points to an
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important mechanism of ideological discourse in general. All ideologies (or
at least all totalistic ideologies) operate i.a. through enemy labelling and
trough the evocation of fear. To emphasise that an inexorable process of
integration would destroy "European civilisation" serves precisely this
purpose.
(13) It must be kept in mind that the "traditional" formations which
commissions described were, most likely, formations which had already been
"recreated" by conquest and administrative intervention. I have not yet
been able to "get into" the literature, but it seems to me that studies such
as Hobsbawm and Ranger's The Invention of Tradition and Thompson's The
Political Mythology of Apartheid are relevant.
(14) This has always been a major component of Afrikaner Nationalist
ideology. Cf. Greenberg 1982, 14, 17-20.
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